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The Crisis in Productivity

FOUR WAYS TO MAKE CITIES MORE EFFICIENT
by E. S. S A V A S / G r a d u a t e S c h o o l of Business, C o l u m b i a U n i v e r s i t y

Government is big business in the United States. There
are almost 80,000 separate government entities in the
country, and together they collect taxes which amount to
one-third of the gross national product. The average
w o r k i n g American can be thought of as w o r k i n g full time
for the government from January 1 to May 2 this year;
only thereafter will he get to keep his earnings.
Contrary to popular impression, most of the money
spent by government for goods and services is spent by
state and local governments, not by the federal government. The former spent $170 billion in 1973, compared to
$107 billion spent by the federal government.
State and local government employees number 11.5
m i l l i o n , about one-seventh of the civilian w o r k force, and
the annual growth of this work force in recent years has
been greater than the total employed in the steel
industry. In fact, between 1955 and 1970 their number
d o u b l e d and the payroll more than tripled.
Given this growing number of public employees and
the taxes used to support their w o r k , it is no wonder that
productivity has emerged as a dominant problem in managing our cities. Particularly vulnerable to charges of
being inefficient are local governments, since they are in
the unenviable position of being responsible for daily delivery of highly visible services. The disparity between
input and o u t p u t looms large in the public eye.
Faced w i t h this pressure, local governments are beginning to apply traditional methods for increasing productivity—capital investment in technology, more training,
and " t i g h t e r management." Such newer tools as systems
analysis, management science, and computers are also
being introduced, sometimes over-enthusiastically, sometimes belatedly, but increasingly w i t h discrimination and
sophistication. Local governments may be five to 10 years
behind industry leaders in the application of these techniques, but the gap is closing as the public sector begins
to compete effectively w i t h the private sector for talent.
However, experienced and frustrated public-sector
managers no longer believe, if they ever d i d , that the
major obstacles to improved performance in government are going to be overcome by technology alone. In
fact, it is becoming increasingly clear that a significant
and permanent increase in government efficiency is
going to be achieved only by recognizing the institutional nature of the obstacles, designing a management
strategy to overcome t h e m , and building the political
support to d o so.
Four major problems deserve our attention: (1) measuring performance; (2) municipal monopolies; (3) civil
service reform; and (4) the government structure.
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Measuring Performance
The basic difficulty is that the result of a government
agency's effort is hard to measure. The business firm uses
profit as the ultimate measure of performance, and a
salesman prospers or fails according to his sales record.
But how does one measure the performance of a school
system, or of an individual teacher? How can one measure the performance of a parks department?
Because of the difficulty in identifying and measuring
output, the typical numbers issued by governments refer
t o input. In effect, one hears a dialogue of the deaf:
Citizen: There is too much crime in this city.
City Official: You're right, we plan to increase the
police department budget by 15 percent.
But such a response is no measure of how effective the
city will be in fighting crime. What it does have is the political virtue of visibility and immediacy. It tangibly
demonstrates official concern for the issue. But it signals
intent, not achievement. Furthermore, if the 15 percent
increase is spent on higher salaries for policemen, it is
unlikely—with all due respect for the men in blue and
their sometimes hazardous occupation—that the force
will be more successful in deterring crime or catching
criminals. Even if the money goes for more policemen,
the gesture may be useless if the present force is doing a
good j o b of catching criminals but the courts fail to
convict them or the prisons fail to rehabilitate t h e m .
The problem of measuring output (either performance
or effectiveness) is now finally being addressed. O n e
example is street-cleaning agencies. Trained observers,
each armed with a standard set of photographs depicting
different levels of street cleanliness, have gone out and
inspected city streets, grading them in accordance with
their photographic scale.
Performance measures for other city agencies are also
being developed. For police w o r k , the "victimization
rate" has emerged as a useful measure. In a statistical
sample of citizen interviews, people are asked if they
have been the victim of a recent crime. This method
appears superior to the " r e p o r t e d crime rate," which is
generally lower, is subject to official distortion, and may
vary according to the expectation or apathy that the
public feels toward its police force.
In short, the emphasis is on measuring government
productivity. A n d it is likely that the process of measuring
it will create the impetus to improve it.
Municipal Monopolies
A city is uniquely vulnerable t o strikes and slowdowns. It
does not have the options of moving to the South,

starting a branch in Hong Kong, or going out of business. It is vulnerable because one of its principal functions is to provide, or at least regulate, services that by
their very nature are monopolies. Thus, cities furnish
public sanitation, police, and fire services; while state
governments regulate the private power and telephone
companies. These are all monopolies of a crucial sort, for
their services cannot be stockpiled or imported.
Therein lies a key problem in the productivity of city
governments. M o n o p o l i e s , whether public or private,
tend to become inefficient. Since most city agencies are
monopolies, their staffs are automatically tempted to
exercise that m o n o p o l y power for their o w n parochial
advantage—and efficiency is rarely seen as an advantage.
In other words, the inefficiency of municipal services is
not due to bad mayors, commissioners, managers,
workers, or unions. It is a natural consequence of a
monopoly system. The public created the monopoly,
the
monopoly behaves in predictable fashion, and there are
no culprits, only scapegoats.
Evidence of malfunctioning municipal monopolies and
low productivity is distressingly easy to find. For example, the mayor's office in New York City was concerned about the performance of its sanitation department, which enjoys a monopoly in the collection of
residential refuse. The efficiency of the department was
compared to that of the private refuse collection industry, and was f o u n d to be only one third as great.
The explanation for the threefold difference in costs is
rooted in such embarrassingly old-fashioned concepts as
close supervision, good direction, and the profit motive.
The more refuse a private hauler picks up in a day, the
more money he makes. In the municipal monopoly,
there is no connection between the two.
A brief glimpse at cities under other economic systems
is intriguing. In socialist Belgrade, refuse collection is
contracted out to private-sector cooperatives. In c o m munist Moscow, collection workers are paid on an i n centive system according to their productivity. Whereas
in New York City—the bastion of capitalism—Wall Street
itself is cleaned by a socialist-style bureaucracy in which
there is no relation between performance and reward.
There is no compelling reason why refuse-collection
service must be provided under monopolistic conditions. A city government can contract with one or more
private firms to perform this work. If a city is too large for
a single f i r m , the city can be divided into sections, each
one to be " a u c t i o n e d off" to the low bidder.
But if what is called for is competition rather than a
monopoly, this does not necessarily mean that the private
sector rather than the public sector should do the work.

There are many places where private collection service is
a monopoly, or at best a collusive oligopoly—a situation
hardly in the public interest. In such cases, competition
can be spurred by government entry into the business.
Why, in fact, does not every city examine carefully the
services it provides, in order to determine whether or not
competition will provide more cost-effective service to
local taxpayers? For example, certain kinds of streetrepair work lend themselves to "contracting o u t . " In
M o n t r e a l , snow removal is performed by this method.
The benefits of competition may also be enjoyed when
interagency competition is organized w i t h i n the local
government or even between governments.
Parking enforcement illustrates this point. Some cities
have parking enforcement agents in a department other
than the police department. If both departments issue
summonses for the same kinds of violations, then a systematic comparison of their relative productivity and
cost-effectiveness can serve to improve the performance
of both agencies.

The delivery of a public service is likely to be
most efficient if that service is offered in a competitive market situation, whether the provider is
a public agency or a private firm.

Unfortunately, so-called experts in public administration often devote their energies to reducing and eliminating competition among government units, on the erroneous assumption that such competition is a wasteful
duplication of effort.
A refreshing and thought-provoking example of deliberately inspired governmental competition comes f r o m
Ljubljana, in Yugoslavia. The city fathers there required
the services of city planners in connection w i t h a particular project, and solicited formal bids for the work not
only from the city planning agency of Ljubljana but also
from the city planning agency of Zagreb, a rival city. An
American observer remarked in awe that he had never
seen city employees anywhere work as hard as Ljubljana's
city planners, w h o were feverishly trying to avoid the
humiliation of losing their o w n city's work to their professional rivals.
As a final illustration of the virtues of c o m p e t i t i o n , a
number of cities in southern California have created a
market environment by purchasing services f r o m the
county, f r o m each other, from specially created districts,
f r o m the private sector, and by providing services
5
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t h r o u g h their o w n work forces. At o n e point in time, for
example, there were 1,437 separate contracts, covering 55
different services, in effect between 74 purchasing cities
a n d 21 producers comprising 16 departments of Los
A n g e l e s C o u n t y and five special service districts. T h e
existence of these c o m p e t i n g alternatives has had a salutary effect on the management and delivery of such
services.
In summary, the delivery of a public service is likely to
be most efficient if that service is offered in a competitive market situation, whether the provider is a public
agency or a private firm. Both quality and cost will suffer
if the p r o v i d e r — p u b l i c or private—has, in effect, a
monopoly.
Civil Service Reform
T h e nation's basic civil service law was written in 1883,
following the assassination of President Garfield by a disgruntled j o b seeker. T h e goal of the law was both n o b l e
and necessary: to assure that the merit principle, rather
than the patronage principle, w o u l d be used for the selection and p r o m o t i o n of federal employees. Subsequently, in reaction to the excesses of the spoils system

Five Soviet specialists are given tour of
mass transit facilities in Los Angeles.
From left, Messrs.
Gilstrap, Korotkov
(USSR), Boldyreff,
Loginov (USSR),
Budentsev (USSR),
Savas, Tkachenko
(USSR), Brasell,
and Kozlov (USSR).

w h i c h had prevailed for the p r e c e d i n g half century, a
civil service reform m o v e m e n t swept the entire country.
In trying to insure against the w r o n g things in public
e m p l o y m e n t — n e p o t i s m , patronage, prejudice, favoritism, c o r r u p t i o n — t h e civil service system has today been
warped and distorted to the point where it can do hardly
anything at all. In order to protect itself against past
abuses, the "merit system'' has often been perverted and
transformed into a closed and meritless system.
After m o r e than 90 years, the stage is set, in my
o p i n i o n , for civil service reform. A true merit system must
be constructed, o n e that provides the opportunity for any
qualified citizen to enter the public service non-politically, to be r e c o g n i z e d and rewarded for g o o d performance, and even to face the possibility of being replaced for unsatisfactory service. Productivity will remain
a quixotic effort unless this fundamental of public personnel management is addressed.
Government Structure
T h e problems of management and productivity in A m e r ican cities derive, in part, from a fundamental mismatch
between the responsibility and the authority of local

City Problems—
Americans
and Russians
Exchange Ideas
W h a t d o the management of city
problems in the Soviet U n i o n and in
the United States have in c o m m o n ? A
program is underway to explore this
question jointly. U n d e r an A m e r ican-Soviet agreement for scientific
and technical cooperation signed in
1972, o n e topic of c o m m o n interest is
the use of computers in the management of large cities. M o r e specifically, it is the d e v e l o p m e n t of urban
management information systems
c o n c e r n i n g mass transit, the movement of goods within cities, and the

governments. Contributing to the mismatch is the gross incongruity between the natural geographic boundaries of
an urban function and the legal boundaries of the political
jurisdiction nominally charged with attending to that function. For example, air pollution as a problem transcends the
boundaries of the central city; yet the municipal government is limited in its ability to address the problem. It cannot, for example, prevent polluted air from wafting in from
a neighboring area, nor curtail automobile use t o an extent
that it will have an impact on the transportation system and
economy of the entire metropolitan complex.
It is necessary to re-examine local government services in
metropolitan areas and to sort them out. W h i c h level of
government should provide which services to w h o m , and
how should those services be paid for? The gradual, evolutionary process of addressing this question is underway,
and involves revenue sharing, regionalism, and neighborhood government. The poverty/welfare p r o b l e m , it seems,
is best handled at the national level, while transportation,
p o l l u t i o n , water supply, and waste disposal are clearly regional issues. O n the other hand, street cleaning, street
repair, and refuse collection have primarily a local impact
and can be handled at that level.

basic organization and performance
of what are k n o w n as municipal
services.
Four cities, New York, Moscow, Los
Angeles, and Leningrad, are formally
involved in the program, but the results should be of value to many cities
in
each
country.
Automobileclogged American cities, for example, can benefit by learning more
about how the movement of trucks is
controlled in Moscow. In addition,
impressive mass transit systems in
large Soviet cities can offer lessons to
American cities which are emerging
f r o m the age of the auto and are planning a more balanced and flexible
transportation mix. O n the other
hand, Soviet cities can learn a great
deal f r o m U.S. cities' computer-based
managerial systems. To a much
greater extent than in the Soviet
U n i o n , American cities have re-

In my o p i n i o n , it is necessary to restructure local governments in order to produce a better match between functional responsibility and effective authority. Present
boundary lines are largely the result of historical happenstance. New tiers of government, regional and local, are
needed to replace the obsolete levels still existing in urban
areas. England is well along in such reforms and some
American cities—including Indianapolis, Jacksonville,
Nashville, and Oklahoma City—have begun to move in this
direction also.

Summary
A fundamental improvement in the productivity of local
government will require far-reaching institutional changes
based on sound management principles. Great political
effort will be needed to make these changes: to introduce
non-partisan performance measurement, t o break up the
municipal monopolies and provide competition in the delivery of services, to restore merit to the civil service system,
and to restructure governments in our metropolitan areas.
But these changes are necessary if the consumers of public
services are to receive better value for the taxes they pay. £

solved the issues of which systems to
b u i l d , how to design t h e m , how to get
them accepted and utilized, and how
to assess their performance.
The American portion of the
program is supported by the National Science Foundation. The p r o gram does not involve exchange of
computer hardware or software.
Rather, it is a more basic exchange of
knowledge, beginning with how the
different participating city governments are organized, what functions
they perform, and how the latter are
carried out.
In 1973, a group of seven Americans, including the author, visited
the Soviet U n i o n in connection w i t h
this project and spent many hours
w i t h officials and computer specialists in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, and
Novosibirsk. Computer use reflects
local problems, and the number one

priority in these cities is housing c o n struction. O n e manifestation of this is
that two of the mayors had formerly
headed the large-scale housing construction programs in their cities.
(Perhaps the American equivalent is
the election of mayors w i t h police
experience
in Philadelphia, Los
Angeles, and
Minneapolis, and
mayors with fiscal experience in New
York and St. Louis.)
In December, 1974, a team of five
Soviet specialists, headed by the d i rector of Moscow's main computer
center, spent t w o weeks visiting m u nicipal data processing centers and
mass transit facilities in New York, Los
Angeles, and San Francisco. At this
writing, a group of American transportation experts is on its way to the
Soviet Union for the next stage of the
program. The results of the exchange are awaited w i t h interest.

